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Abstract 
Joseph Addison’s 1713 play, Cato: A Tragedy, dramatizes the final days of Cato the Younger’s 
resistance to Julius Caesar before his eventual suicide at Utica in 46 BC. Although Addison initially 
seems to present Cato as a model for emulation, we argue that Addison is ultimately critical of both 
Cato and the Stoicism he embodies. Via the play’s romantic subplot and via his work as an essayist, 
Addison offers a revision of the Catonic model, reworking it into a gentler model that elevates 
qualities such as love, friendship, and sympathy and that is more appropriate to the type of peaceful 
civil and commercial society he wishes to promote. 
 
The uncompromising virtue of Cato the Younger dominates the action of Joseph Addison’s Cato: A 
Tragedy. The 1713 theatrical drama depicts republican Rome’s doomed resistance to Julius Caesar’s 
growing power and Cato’s ultimate decision to take his own life rather than to submit to what he sees 
as the tyrannical rule of Caesar and the suffocation of Roman liberty. Offsetting the political action 
is a romantic subplot, featuring a romance between Marcia, Cato’s daughter, and the Numidian prince 
Juba, as well as a romantic triangle involving Cato’s two sons and the daughter of a Roman senator. 
Cato was wildly popular throughout the eighteenth century, in Great Britain, North America, and 
much of continental Europe. During Addison’s own lifetime, both Whigs and Tories tried to 
appropriate the play--and Cato’s principled defense of liberty--for their own causes; Alexander 
Pope’s account of the play’s London premiere describes the furious competition between the two 
parties to applaud Cato most loudly.1 For the American colonists, the play’s themes of liberty, virtue, 
and resistance to tyranny also held particular significance. Not only did George Washington have the 
play staged on the eve of battle at Valley Forge, but Cato’s speeches were so thoroughly woven into 
the American colonial mind that some of the most famous and inspirational lines of the period--
including Nathan Hale’s “I regret that I have but one life to lose for my country” and Patrick Henry’s 
“Give me liberty or give me death”--are drawn from Addison’s Cato, and the play clearly influenced 
other members of the Founding generation, such as Benjamin Franklin and Noah Webster.2 
Whether on stage or in the wings, the figure of Cato dominates every scene of Addison’s drama. The 
embodiment of Roman greatness and of virtue in the face of adversity, Cato initially seems the model 
Addison offers for emulation.3 Within the drama, Cato’s example and judgment orient the other 
characters to what is true and what is false, what is virtuous and what is vicious. As Juba notes, “I’d 
rather have that man / Approve my deeds, than worlds for my admirers” (II.5).4 Yet Addison’s 
depiction of Cato stops short of being an unqualified endorsement. While the theatrical Cato is 
certainly the standard by which other characters judge themselves, their emotions, and their behavior, 
a closer examination of the play reveals that Addison himself does not completely endorse Cato as 
an exemplar. He is critical of Cato on several fronts, particularly for the rigidity of his Stoicism and 
his prioritizing “stern” principles over personal attachments and the “softer” passions of sympathy, 
love, and friendship. The dramatic Cato thus requires revision and modification if he is to serve as a 
model for Addison’s eighteenth-century audience. Via the play’s various subplots--particularly the 
Marcia-Juba subplot which unites Cato’s two closest surrogates in marriage--Addison indicates the 
direction such a modification must take.5 Addison’s efforts as playwright are complemented by his 
work as essayist, in that at least part of Addison’s project in The Spectator seems the project of a 
moralist, and the reworking of Cato’s qualities into a gentler and more moderate model, one better 
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suited to eighteenth-century Britain and to the peaceable civil and commercial society he wishes to 
advance there.6 
This interpretation of the play goes against most critics, who view Cato as the “ethical core” of the 
play and the embodiment of Addisonian virtue. M. M. Kelsell’s suggestion that Cato is “an ideal 
representation of the highest virtues, both public and private” is but one example of the standard 
reading.7 In arguing that Addison maintains a critical distance from his hero, we follow a path first 
suggested by J. M. Amistead and James S. Malek over forty years ago but largely neglected until 
recent work by scholars such as Lisa A. Freeman and Richard Terry. By moving Cato out of a 
spotlight as a model for emulation, our reading of the play also brings the romantic subplot closer to 
center stage, casting it as central both to Addison’s reworking of Cato’s character and to his broader 
philosophic and cultural project. This, too, runs counter to the dominant line of criticism since the 
eighteenth century, according to which the love scenes are peripheral to the play and were merely 
appended to humor the public.8 We note, however, that foregrounding the romantic subplot is 
consistent with the structure of the play itself: Cato begins by announcing the conflict between love 
and Cato’s stern virtue in Portius’s opening-scene exhortation to his brother (“And call up thy father 
to thy soul: / To quell the tyrant Love”), and although the tragedy ends with Cato’s suicide in the 
name of his principles, his final words arrange the marriages of the play’s pairs of lovers, Marcia to 
Juba and Lucia to Portius, thus underlining the significance of the romantic subplot and the reworking 
of Cato’s character represented in it.9 While both Terry and Freeman highlight the romantic subplot, 
our argument differs from their arguments in some crucial aspects. With Terry, we suggest that 
Addison finds Cato’s character unsatisfactory, but we differ from Terry in focusing particularly on 
the Marcia-Juba love plot as the Addisonian corrective to Cato’s defects, and we go beyond Terry’s 
analysis in arguing that Addison’s criticism of Cato is part of the larger cultural project of politeness 
that Addison undertakes both in the play and in The Spectator.10 We also differ significantly from 
Freeman, with whom we share the notion that the love theme is essential to both the play and to 
Addison’s broader cultural project, but who casts her argument in terms of the politics of gender and 
the gendered agency of ideological projects.11 
Set just following Julius Caesar’s victory over the Roman republican forces at Pharsalus, Cato: A 
Tragedy depicts the final days of Cato the Younger’s resistance at Utica. The play’s main action 
involves a conspiracy against Cato by the Roman senator Sempronius and the Numidian general 
Syphax. Cato’s inflexibility and high-handed rejection of Caesar’s emissary provides the pretext for 
Cato’s supporters’ attempted rebellion. Ultimately, both the conspiracy and the rebellion are 
unsuccessful, the conspiracy’s leaders are killed, and Cato’s loyal son, Marcus, loses his life in battle 
as well. The tragedy also includes a romantic subplot, which we argue is essential to the meaning of 
the play. In this subplot, the Numidian prince Juba strives for the affections of Cato’s daughter 
Marcia, while Cato’s sons compete for the affections of Marcia’s friend, Lucia. The play ends with 
Cato preferring to end his life in suicide rather than suffer Caesar’s rule, and with the pairings off of 
Juba and Marcia, and Portius and Lucia. 
 
Cato and the Stoic Ideal 
Central to both the historical and the dramatic Cato is his Stoicism, and Addison’s simultaneous 
embrace and critique of Cato’s character mirrors his treatment of the Stoicism with which Cato is 
virtually synonymous. As a philosophy, Stoicism emphasizes self-command through the 
subordination of the passions to reason, in order to achieve a proper degree of detachment and the 
impartiality which enable an individual to endure misfortune and failure with equanimity. Other 
aspects of Stoicism include living in harmony with nature, and as part of its commitment to that 
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harmony, a belief in the unity and interdependence of the cardinal virtues of justice, temperance, 
prudence, and fortitude; and the belief that liberty requires a life committed to these virtues. For the 
Stoic, liberty in the absence of virtue cannot truly be considered liberty, and the vicious individual 
cannot be not free, whatever his political condition. Seneca praised Cato’s suicide as a sublime 
example of liberty, and he regarded Cato the Younger as one of the two great wise men or models for 
imitation in the Stoic tradition.12 
In contrast with Seneca, Addison’s endorsement of Cato and of Stoicism is qualified at best, for the 
play calls into question the degree to which Cato ought to be considered a model for emulation. 
Addison is not, of course, the first to suggest that Cato might not be the ideal Stoic, and some Romans 
saw Cicero--who himself criticized Cato for the inhumanity or immoderation of his Stoicism--as 
offering a more flexible, prudent, moderate, and humane version of Stoicism.13 Freeholder 51, which 
declares Cicero and not Cato to be “the most consummate Statesman of all Antiquity,” suggests that 
Addison also found Cato’s Stoicism politically imprudent.14 Addison’s critique in Cato, however, is 
more extensive than the political critique lodged via Freeholder 51, for while the dramatic Cato is 
laudable for many reasons, we shall see that Addison’s tragedy depicts his rigid attachment to 
principle as not merely impolitic, but inhumane. 
Thus, although there are aspects to Stoicism which Addison appears to admire--particularly its 
emphasis on liberty and self-command, the idea that virtue and liberty are inextricably linked, and 
the importance of character and constancy in changing circumstances--his play questions Cato’s 
“rigid virtue” (I.4) and attachment to Stoic principles. Addison’s Spectator essays offer additional, 
more direct criticisms of the bizarre and inhuman outcomes to which Cato’s strict adherence to 
Stoicism would appear to lead. Yet Addison does not simply reject the Stoicism Cato represents; 
rather, we argue that he attempts to moderate that doctrine and to adapt it to the human condition by 
giving it a more social and polite character, with politeness understood in the eighteenth-century sense 
as a culture of sociability in which amiability, conversational skill, and educated taste were the most 
important markers of gentlemanliness.15 The culture of politeness promoted by Addison sought to 
transcend political and religious division by creating a public sphere whose rules of engagement 
required the moderation but not the extirpation of difference. As such, polite society accommodated 
diversity both by promoting sociability among different groups and by modeling a “communal vision 
for a complex society.”16 In softening Cato’s Stoicism, Addison also opens a greater role for the 
affections and the social passions which attach us to others. In particular, he elevates the bonds of 
friendship and love as part of his general emphasis on the place of human attachments and the private 
sphere within his understanding of a life lived well. 
 
An Exemplary Hero? 
To understand Addison’s complex stance toward his play’s protagonist, it is first helpful to explore 
how Cato’s character is depicted in the tragedy. By Cato’s own account, his example teaches 
“watchings, abstinence and toil / Laborious virtues all” (II.4). In particular, Cato’s language 
emphasizes his steadfast attachment to the principles of justice and Roman liberty. The significance 
of liberty to Cato’s understanding of virtue cannot be overstated, for he asserts that it is liberty which 
inspires souls and makes life happy. Death in defense of liberty is a glorious death; thus, the demise 
of Rome’s liberty is a loss worthy of Cato’s tears, whereas the death of his own son in defense of 
Roman liberty is not. Cato’s “soul breathes liberty,” but it is not simply freedom from constraint 
which Cato endorses. Rather, he commends--and Addison appears to endorse--an ordered liberty in 
which rational control of passions shapes the passions themselves, until the individual desires that 
which he ought to desire, in the way he ought to desire it. In Cato’s words, “A day, an hour of virtuous 
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liberty / Is worth a whole eternity in bondage” (II.1, emphasis added). Cato’s understanding of liberty 
is linked to law, moderation, and justice; the political liberty he praises is associated with the rule of 
law, with the protection of rights, and with limited power (III.5). Roman liberty, it seems, “reforms” 
the soul by bringing the restraint of law to human nature, by moderating the passions, by teaching 
men sociability, and by bringing “wisdom, discipline, and the liberal arts” to them (I.4). 
Addison reveals Cato’s character as much through the words of the other characters as through Cato’s 
own speeches and deeds. The others’ conversations about the Cato they perceive emphasize the 
qualities we have already seen in him, including his steady temper, his selfless devotion to Roman 
liberty, his unwavering virtue in the face of adversity, and his greatness of spirit/soul, as well as the 
“godlike height” to which his virtue has elevated him (I.4). Beyond these speeches, Cato’s qualities 
are most fully visible in the character traits and words of his daughter Marcia and her suitor, Juba. 
Given the importance we ascribe to the eventual pairing of Marcia and Juba as Addison’s 
modification of Cato to fit the world of sociability, it is not entirely surprising that Addison chooses 
them as the characters through whom Cato’s qualities are manifested. 
Although the audience is told that Cato’s sons Marcus and Portius strive to emulate him,17 Marcia is 
said to be the child from whom “Cato’s soul / shines out in everything she acts or speaks” (I.5), and 
whose physical beauty is complemented by “inward greatness, unaffected wisdom, / And sanctity of 
manners” (I.5). Marcia is depicted as sharing her father’s devotion to Rome, his severity, and his 
constancy of mind (I.4, IV.3). She is in many ways Cato’s surrogate, albeit a surrogate in female 
form.18 Addison, however, presents two criticisms of Marcia which presumably apply equally to her 
qualities as manifested by Cato. While the first of these criticisms, Sempronius’s calling her 
“haughty” and deriding her “stubborn virtue” (III.7), could be read simply as the complaints of the 
spurned suitor, Cato is similarly criticized (albeit by Sempronius again) for being “ambitiously 
sententious” (I.2), proud, stubborn, and haughty (I.4). Sempronius is not alone in his criticisms of 
Marcia’s Cato-like character, and even Marcia’s friend Lucia suggests that Marcia is overly severe in 
her reprimand of Juba for his ill-timed expression of love for her (I.6). Although Marcia’s severity 
toward Juba is moderated before the final act and she yields to her love for him, Cato remains 
unmoved by private concerns even in the face of his son’s death.19 Because Marcia’s stern virtue is 
softened by the end of the play--primarily through her love for Juba--she comes to embody a tempered 
version of Cato’s virtue, one in which the social ties of family, community, and love serve to moderate 
the principles of radical independence and complete emotional detachment embodied by her father. 
These revisions of Cato’s Stoicism are more in keeping with Addison’s own project in The Spectator 
of bringing philosophy “out of the Closets” and into coffeehouses, where it could regulate the 
passions and shape the sensibilities of the middling classes, in order to promote moderation, self-
discipline, and the pursuit of the public interest. 
If Marcia’s character embodies Cato’s virtues, Juba offers perhaps the fullest articulations of what 
Cato and his example mean to his observers. Through Juba’s words, we learn that Cato represents the 
best qualities of the Roman soul--including honor, faith, goodness, justice, patience, self-discipline, 
austerity, discipline, strength, and steadfastness. Cato has served as a father figure for Juba, and his 
example is said to have taught the young prince “to break the fierceness of his native temper” (I.1). 
In a lengthy speech in the play’s opening act, Juba offers an extended description of the Roman soul, 
emphasizing its transformation of the barbarian or natural soul. With Juba clearly representing the 
latter and Cato the former, the speech illuminates Cato’s character: 
 
These are virtues of a meaner rank, 
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Perfections that are placed in bones and nerves. 
A Roman soul is bent on higher views: 
To civilize the rude, unpolished world, 
And lay it under the restraint of laws; 
To make man mild, and sociable to man; 
To cultivate the wild, licentious savage 
With wisdom, discipline, and liberal arts-- 
The embellishments of life; virtues like these 
Make human nature shine, reform the soul, 
And break our fierce barbarians into men. (I.4) 
As presented in Cato, to be Roman means--among other things--to be capable of regulating the 
passions and restraining the appetites by law and by education. Such cultivation of the soul defines 
one as a man (or a human) rather than a savage or a barbarian, for the ability to free oneself from 
enslavement to the passions and appetites is the defining human characteristic. Moreover, this self-
discipline enables humans to live together both peacefully and freely; consistent with this, the play’s 
understanding of liberty is ordered freedom, based upon an internal governance. Cato’s reference to 
“an hour, a day, of virtuous liberty” alludes to this connection between self-governance and liberty; 
such liberty, he concludes, is worth an “eternity in servitude.” Without individual self-governance, 
political liberty is not possible, for self-governance provides the necessary foundation for external 
structures which frame public interactions between members of the body politic. The state whose 
citizens are enslaved to their own desires cannot maintain its political liberty, for its citizens will 
either willingly submit themselves to a domestic tyrant or--extending beyond internal politics--they 
will lack the military virtue necessary to defend themselves from external threats.20 In Cato, Addison 
suggests that late republican Rome finds itself in precisely this crisis and that Rome’s political 
situation both mirrors and is due to the disorder of the Roman people’s souls. As Cato’s son Marcus 
asks, “what can Cato do / Against a world, a base degenerate world, / That courts the yoke, and bows 
the neck to Caesar?” (I.1). Political freedom, it seems, cannot be restored without reinvigorating 
citizen virtue, and in this sense, Cato’s virtue does serve as a model for emulation. This theme is also 
developed in Addison’s essays. Freeholder 29, for example, fleshes out the connection Addison saw 
between virtue and liberty, adding piety as well--though a piety consistent with Addison’s own 
Latitudinarism, which he saw as a middle course: less authoritarian and more tolerant than the High 
Church Anglicanism, yet less prone to dangerous enthusiasm than the dissenting Protestant sects. He 
asserts that “no government can flourish which doth not encourage and propagate religion and 








Yet Cato and the qualities he represents do not go uncriticized in the play. Not only is Cato directly 
criticized by other characters, but he also adheres to his principles with a severity and rigidity which 
seem likely to strike the play’s spectators as unnatural. Taken together, both the explicit criticisms 
and the audience reaction to Cato suggest that he is not intended as a decisive role model. Via the 
romantic subplot which unites Cato’s closest surrogates, Juba and Marcia, Addison offers a revision 
of Cato, in which his severity is tempered by the “softer” ties of love and affection and reworked into 
something closer to the type of polite and sociable character endorsed in The Spectator. The 
corrections Addison believes are necessary to Cato’s character are best seen via the play’s explicit 
and implicit criticisms of his qualities, and it is to these criticisms we now turn. 
Syphax, one of the chief conspirators against Cato, is Cato’s primary critic within the play, railing 
against Cato’s “pride, rank pride, and haughtiness of soul” (I.4) and encouraging Juba to abandon 
him.21 Addison also chooses Syphax as the voice for two significant and substantive assaults on 
Cato’s character, through Syphax’s critiques of Cato’s understanding of virtue and honor.22 The first 
of these two major critiques, a debunking of virtue, comes following Juba’s elaboration of the 
cultivating effects of Roman virtue in the opening act (I.4).23 Far from accepting Juba’s claim that 
Roman virtue makes “our fierce barbarians into men” or that the practice of virtue allows the highest-
-and most fully human--aspects to emerge, Syphax offers an extensive rebuttal in which he asserts 
that the purpose of virtue is to promote hypocrisy. The aim of “these wondrous civilizing arts / This 
Roman polish” is, he claims, “to disguise our passions, / To set our looks at variance with our 
thoughts.” What Juba and Cato would call virtuous behavior or self-control is in Syphax’s account 
nothing more than artful deceit in which all connection between what is believed and what is said has 
been severed. For Syphax, Roman virtue does not “Make human nature shine, reform the soul, / And 
break our fierce barbarians into men”; instead, it denatures men, transforming them into inauthentic 
beings and changing them “into other creatures / Than that what our nature and the gods designed” 
(I.4). Syphax’s own understanding of virtue emphasizes naturalness over artificial or learned 
behaviors, praising the severity and austerity of the African hunter.24 
The second major critique of Cato comes in Act II, scene 5, when Syphax offers an almost Falstaffian 
critique of honor, another key principle embodied by Cato. Having listened to Juba’s outpouring of 
his love for Marcia and his concerns that revealing that “weakness” of his soul to Cato has caused 
Cato to disapprove of him, Syphax suggests that Juba might gain Marcia simply by abducting her. 
Juba recoils from this suggestion, criticizing Syphax both for “such dishonest thoughts” and for trying 
to “seduce my youth to do such an act that would destroy my honour” (II.5). Syphax scoffs at Juba’s 
devotion to the “fine imaginary notion” of honor, disparaging it as a dangerous and seductive illusion 
which induces young men to foolishly risk their lives. Honor, he says, “draws in raw and 
unexperienced men / To real mischiefs, while they hunt a shadow.” Syphax further suggests that even 
the most honorable individuals are only recently rehabilitated criminals--according to Syphax, the 
high virtue of the Roman republic traces its origins not back to honor, but to the rape of the Sabines. 
Syphax asserts that what is true of the Romans is true of all men and that what is called “honor” is 
merely disguised vice and criminality. Syphax voices a Machiavellian perspective: stubborn 
adherence to ideas such as honor or virtue will only lead man to ruin, in a world peopled by the 
dishonorable and vicious. Juba’s youthful infatuation with Cato prevents him from reading mankind’s 
true nature and inclinations; according to Syphax, such blindness is dangerous, for Juba risks finding 
himself unprepared and defenseless in the real world. 
The possibility that Addison intends the substance Syphax’s criticism of honor to be ultimately 
persuasive seems slim, for Juba’s defense of honor within the play is picked up by Addison in later 
essays. In response to Syphax’s assertion that he would sacrifice his own honor should his service to 
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(or love for) Juba require it, Juba calls honor “a sacred tie, the law of kings, / the noble mind’s 
distinguishing perfection, that aids and strengthens virtue where it meets her, / and imitates her 
actions, where she is not.” Far from leading one to ruin, then, honor either crowns virtue or serves as 
a type of training, a habituation to the ways of virtue. Honor accompanies the virtuous, and for those 
who are not independently virtuous, honor helps them to follow virtue’s course as well as perhaps 
developing the qualities of soul which bring them closer to actual possession of the virtues. Guardian 
161, which quotes the scene of Cato, reiterates Juba’s understanding. Calling honor “graceful and 
ornamental to human nature,” Addison observes that the sense of honor is “to be met with in minds 
which are naturally noble, or in such as have been cultivated by great examples, or a refined 
education.” 
While Addison does not endorse the substance of the Syphaxic assaults on Cato’s principles, they 
remain an important element of his reworking of Cato in two senses. First, the very presence of 
repeatedly voiced criticism in the play begins the undermining of Cato’s authority as a moral 
exemplar. Certainly, the criticisms are voiced by Cato’s enemy, but Syphax is a compelling character, 
and his challenges to the authoritativeness of Cato’s principles--challenges that end, as Terry correctly 
notes, with “the ring of rhetorical triumph”--are surely intended to give both Juba and the play’s 
audience pause.25 More importantly, however, there is an element of truth to the criticisms’ content, 
for while the substance of Syphax’s critique of honor is not meant to be persuasive, he is also making 
a more general and reasonable point about the subordination of life to a mere abstraction. Syphax’s 
observation to Juba that “you have not read mankind” (II.5) underscores the argument that the Catonic 
virtue to which Juba aspires represents the type of theoretical principle that is ill-suited to the real 
world. This aspect of Syphax’s critique would be more consistent with the centrality of ordinary life 
in Addison’s essays and with his own statements about the need for moderation and the undesirability 
of carrying principles--whether political, religious, or moral--too far.26 
In addition to the explicit criticisms of Cato voiced by Syphax, at least four moments in the play’s 
dramatic action seem designed to evoke the audience’s discomfort with or even disapproval of Cato, 
thereby inviting the tragedy’s spectators to reconsider Cato as a model--for his fellow Romans, for 
Addison, and for themselves. The first of these is Cato’s suicide, which historical evidence suggests 
to have been both morally and dramatically problematic for Addison himself.27 Not only is presenting 
a character who kills himself as a model for emulation thorny--particularly in a Christian context--
but the very reasoning which leads Cato to find suicide the best option also typifies the rigidity, self-
absorption, and unnatural detachment for which Addison criticizes Cato elsewhere in the play. Taking 
one’s life might also suggest a proud arrogance or hubris, insofar as it implies a claim to know the 
inherently unknowable workings of providence. Yet as Addison notes in The Spectator, “we are not 
in a proper situation to judge the Counsels by which Providence acts” (Spectator 237).28 
Nevertheless, Cato’s suicide was an unavoidable part of the story--not only was Addison bound by 
the historical facts, but he also had to grapple with the common interpretations which cast Cato as a 
hero and which viewed his death as the ultimate proof of his commitment to liberty and virtue.29 One 
of the things that makes Cato’s story “a tragedy” is that his patriotism, love of liberty, and willingness 
to defy the superior force of Caesar are indeed admirable character traits, yet those very virtues, and 
the strength of Cato’s attachment to them, make his suicide inevitable. However much Addison might 
have admired some of Cato’s principles, he could not have fully endorsed Cato’s willingness to take 
his own life, since Addison understood living with misfortune as nobler (and perhaps more difficult) 
than escaping from it through death. Spectator 357’s discussion of Milton’s Paradise Lost makes this 
clear, for Addison notes, “The Resolution of dying to end our Miseries does not shew such a degree 
of Magnanimity as a Resolution to bear them, and submit to the Dispensations of Providence.” 
Attempting to live virtuously in the world--even a corrupt world--requires greater heroism and virtue 
than simply withdrawing from it. In this sense, then, Addison might have preferred a Cicero, who 
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chose to try to work within the system to restore Roman liberty, than Cato, who chose to remove 
himself from it. 
Addison offers a second tacit criticism of his hero in his depiction of Cato’s hostility to and ultimate 
rejection of Caesar’s envoy Decius. Cato’s reply to Decius’s salutation--the traditional “Caesar sends 
health to Cato”--is a curt “Could he send it to Cato’s slaughtered friends, it would be welcome” (II.2) 
and sets the tone for the entire scene. Cato rejects each of the overtures Decius makes on behalf of 
Caesar, refusing to entertain Decius’s entreaties that Cato name the terms for reconciling himself with 
Caesar. While Cato’s refusal to negotiate with Caesar is indicative of his admirable attachment to 
Roman liberty, the manner in which he rejects Caesar’s overtures is high-handed, ungracious--even 
churlish--and certainly impolitic, if not suicidal. As Decius notes, “A style like this becomes a 
conqueror,” rather than the defeated and outnumbered Cato. Not only does Cato shut down all 
possible routes for compromise and reconciliation, but he also seems to take every opportunity to 
alienate and inflame Caesar. Indeed, Cato’s language combines severity and a certain extravagance-
-an immoderation that Addison also conveys in Syphax’s denunciation of “the extravagance of 
[Cato’s] virtue” in II.5. In his high-handed rejection of Decius, Cato’s concern appears to be either 
exclusively for his principles or, interpreted less benignly, for his own reputation. Whichever 
interpretation one makes of Cato’s motives, he is clearly not concerned with the safety of his family 
and his supporters, and he is more than willing to bring Caesar’s wrath down upon them as well as 
upon himself. Moreover, it could be argued that Rome has also moved from the forefront of Cato’s 
concern.30 Clearly disgusted with the erosion of Roman virtue which has permitted Caesar’s rise, 
Cato prefers the extreme course of washing his hands of this Rome rather than taking the more 
moderate, Ciceronian course of trying to work from within either to rehabilitate it or to temper the 
effects of Caesar’s rule.31 In Spectator 243’s discussion of Stoicism, Addison condemns precisely this 
type of rigidity and this view of the options as a zero-sum game. Writing commentary on the political 
and religious factionalism of his own time that could certainly also be read as direct criticism of Cato, 
Addison states, “A man must be excessively stupid, as well as uncharitable, who believes that there 
is no Virtue but on his own Side, that there are not Men as honest as himself who may differ from 
him in political principles.” 
If the scene with Decius caused the audience to question Cato’s priorities, his apparent preference for 
himself and his own principles over his supporters and his family, and also perhaps the inflexibility 
of those principles, two additional episodes within the play serve to deepen those doubts. The most 
dramatically striking of these moments is Cato’s reaction to the death of his son Marcus. Upon 
learning that Marcus has fallen during combat with Caesar’s forces, Cato’s first response is to express 
his satisfaction with the manner of Marcus’s death and to thank the gods that Marcus did not shirk 
his duty of defending Roman liberty. Even the arrival of Marcus’s corpse does not evoke paternal 
grief. While Cato’s speech as he meets the body is the eloquent and inspirational “How beautiful is 
death, when earned by virtue! ... what pity is it / That we can die but once to serve our country!” 
(IV.4), it seems unnatural to react by praising the virtuous manner of the death before and without 
evincing even the smallest emotion as a grieving father. Addison underlines Cato’s preference for the 
public over the private in the next speech given to Cato, in which Cato chides his fellow Romans for 
mourning Marcus: “Why mourn you thus? let not a private loss / Afflict your hearts. ‘Tis Rome 
requires our tears” (IV.4, emphasis added). In Cato’s judgment, Rome’s life is more important that 
the life of his son, and the remainder of the speech (“‘Tis Rome requires our tears ... Rome is no more. 
/ Oh liberty! Oh virtue! Oh my country!”) emphasizes Cato’s prioritization of Rome over his son. 
Cato is capable of mourning, but only of mourning Rome, or the idea of Roman liberty. He cannot 
mourn his son because he does not understand love for a particular individual, as opposed to love for 
an abstract principle. The contrast between a father’s natural grief and Cato’s unnatural self-command 
is underscored through the comparison with Marcia’s reaction to the news of Juba’s supposed death 
in IV.3. Her “Have I cause to rave, and beat my breast, / To rend my heart with grief” and “Talk not 
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of comfort, ‘tis for lighter ills. ... I will indulge my sorrows, and give way / To all the pangs and fury 
of despair, / That man, that best of men, deserved it from me” seems an appropriate response to the 
death of a beloved. Via these contrasts, Addison reminds us that just as undue attachment to one’s 
familial ties merits criticism, so too does Cato’s undue detachment from these natural connections.32 
Cato’s general denigration of private in favor of public attachments extends even to the sweetest of 
private attachments: marriage. Addison does not depict Cato’s own marital situation,33 but the 
unfolding of the Juba-Marcia subplot reveals to the audience both something of Cato’s position on 
the private attachment of romantic love as well as a final Addisonian critique of Cato. At the end of 
Act I, scene 4, Juba begins to confess his love for Cato’s daughter to her father, but he is instantly 
silenced by Cato, who wants to hear nothing of this subject. Cato replies, “I would not hear a word / 
Should lessen thee in my esteem: remember / The hand of fate is over us, and heaven / Extracts 
severity from all our thoughts: It is not now a time to talk of aught / But chains or conquest, liberty 
or death.” Speaking and thinking of love is inopportune during republican Rome’s crisis, and Cato 
again places the public before the private. 
Considered by itself or within its context, Cato’s reaction to Juba’s profession of love seems perfectly 
sensible, for it is untimely to talk of love while the republic and the lives of its supporters are in 
immediate peril. Further details within the play, however, suggest that no matter what the timing, 
Cato opposes the private attachment of romantic love or marriage as a distraction from the proper 
duties of the citizen-statesman. Given the importance of Cato as Juba’s model or standard, Juba’s 
characterization of his love for Marcia as “the weakness of my soul” (I.5) merits consideration as a 
correct statement of Cato’s view.34 This viewpoint is echoed by the other Cato-like character in the 
play, Marcia, who praises Juba’s good qualities, then adds that his love would make any woman “but 
Marcia” happy, for “While Cato lives, his daughter has no right / To love or hate, but as his choice 
directs” (IV.1). Yet “his choice” has not directed that Marcia ally herself with a man other than Juba; 
instead, it has dictated (albeit implicitly, though through his own words and example) that she should 
ally herself with no man.35 Only when Marcia believes Juba dead does she regret having hidden her 
love, and only then does neither “modesty nor [Catonic?] virtue” prohibit revealing that love. Her 
confession to the dead Sempronius (disguised as Juba) is overheard by the real Juba; by this dramatic 
device, Addison unites the two lovers and allows them to discover their mutual love. Ecstatic in mood, 
the scene is the climax of the romantic theme, and the pitch of its language seems designed to carry 
the audience along. The eighteenth-century theatergoer would undoubtedly enter into sympathy with 
the lovers, echoing Marcia’s “With pleasure and amaze, I stand transported!” and Juba’s “Am rapt 
with joy ... I’m lost in ecstasy” as their mutual love breaks through “its weak restraints, and burns in 
its full luster.” By aligning the audience’s emotions with Juba and Marcia at this juncture, Addison 
dramatically indicates a limitation to Cato’s understanding, for Cato’s austere virtue does not give 
due weight to eros generally and to romantic love in particular; as we have also seen, he discounts 
the private attachments in general. The audience senses that Juba and Marcia are right in loving each 
other, whereas the suppression of that emotion à la Cato seems unnatural. Addison’s offering the 
Juba-Marcia love plot as a correction to Cato is consistent with his elevation of love in Spectator 397, 
where he calls love “the most delightful passion,” and characterizes it as the source of many of the 
other important social passions. “Pity,” Addison notes, “is nothing else but love softned by a degree 
of Sorrow; In short, it is a kind of pleasing Anguish, as well as generous Sympathy, that knits Mankind 
together, and blends them in the same common Lot.”36 To be sure, Juba’s final line of the scene--”Let 
Caesar have the world, if Marcia’s mine”--swings too far in the other direction, and it indicates the 
need for some of the self-control embodied by Cato. Juba in particular has a lesson in moderation and 




From Stoicism to Sociability 
The Spectator mirrors Addison’s ambiguous attitude toward his drama’s protagonist. Seneca’s 
observation that “it must be a Pleasure to Jupiter himself to look down from Heaven, and see Cato 
amidst the Ruins of his country preserving his Integrity” is paraphrased with apparent approval by 
Addison in Spectator 237, yet this praise of Cato’s character and judgment is modified in the 
following paragraph. Quoting the New Testament’s “we see but in part, and as in a Glass darkly,”37 
Addison suggests the impossibility of understanding the connections between events, perhaps subtly 
also pointing to the hubris of Cato’s committing suicide because he judged the situation beyond hope. 
Just six Spectator papers later, Addison attacks Stoicism as “the pedantry of virtue” and mocks Cato 
for taking the Stoic identification of virtue and beauty so literally that he (Cato) “would not allow any 
one but a Virtuous Man to be handsom” (Spectator 243). The condemnation of Cato’s virtue as 
“pedantic” is particularly telling when read in the context of Spectator 105: there, as Klein observes, 
the various pedantries are associated with resistance to or intolerance of other points of view, the 
same type of prejudice and partisanship attacked elsewhere in the Spectator.38 
Given the close identification of Cato with Stoicism, Addison’s critiques of Cato and Stoicism should 
be read together, and they invite consideration of whether Addison believes Stoicism to be inherently 
problematic, or whether he thinks it is merely the Catonic embodiment of Stoic principles which goes 
awry. We suggest that Addison finds both Stoicism and the Catonic interpretation of Stoicism to be 
defective, and that he judges both the philosophic doctrine and its particular embodiment to be 
excessive or extreme. Stoicism is deficient from an Addisonian perspective because it encourages a 
certain excess or intemperance, including undue independence and detachment, and because it fails 
to take into account the importance of human attachments and passions, especially the importance of 
love. Similarly, Cato is deficient as a role model, both because his principles are partially misguided 
and because he pursues those principles in an immoderate manner, without regard to the situation or 
to other contextual matters which might justify or even require softening virtue’s austerity. Thus, 
although Cato is a tragedy because Roman liberty is lost to Caesar and because the play’s hero 
commits suicide, it is also a tragedy because Cato’s flaws lead him to conclude that suicide is the only 
option for him and because he commits suicide with little regret and with little thought for his family 
and his supporters.39 
Addison does see much in Cato that is praiseworthy--particularly his constancy, his self-control, and 
the strength of his commitment to justice and liberty--and he finds much to admire in ancient 
Stoicism’s virtues of temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence. In the end, however, Addison can 
endorse neither Stoicism nor its Catonic embodiment. Accordingly, Spectator 243 picks up the play’s 
critiques and mocks Cato overtly for extending his principles of moral perfection ad absurdum.40 The 
essay immediately continues by making clear that Cato’s tendency to carry even his laudable 
principles too far is merely one individual’s manifestation of a defect which Addison finds inherent 
in Stoicism. Addison then broadens the critique of Cato, disparaging the Stoics more generally for 
thinking that “they could not represent the Excellence of Virtue, if they did not comprehend in the 
Notion of it all possible Perfection.” In the same vein, while Cato’s aloofness from his family and 
friends is consistent with Stoic principles counseling detachment from people and emotional distance 
in our relations with them as part of the ordering and control of the passions which is a prerequisite 
to a virtuous, free, and happy life--a life that is less subject to the winds, to fate, and to surprise--
Addison suggests that the Stoics go too far in their quest for self-mastery and in their complete 
renunciation of passion and personal attachment. The passions should not be suppressed; rather, they 
should be governed “like free Subjects rather [than] slaves” if they are going to be able to provide the 
necessary energy and motive force to pursue a good life in community with others. Too strictly 
governed, the passions become incapable of drawing humans together--”abject and unfit for the 
purposes for which they were designed” (Spectator 408); one of Stoicism’s defects is precisely its 
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attempt to quell the natural impulses which bring humans into society (and eventually, into political 
society) with each other. Like Aristotle, who finds the man without a city to be either a beast or a 
god, Addison finds the Stoic model of the dispassionate man à la Cato ultimately to be inhuman.41 
The Stoic virtues may be laudable, but from an Addisonian perspective, they cannot be the essential 
virtues for humans, as they do not take into account our social and political natures. Because Addison 
understands social life to be both a necessary and a good thing--as Spectator 9 reminds us, “Man is 
said to be a Sociable Animal”--Cato’s Stoicism must be “socialized” and softened, rendered more 
human, flexible, and compassionate if it is to be incorporated into the polite world of The Spectator. 
Accordingly, The Spectator revises the Stoic understanding of virtue by advancing Addison’s own 
cardinal virtues of justice, charity, and munificence.42 As contextualized in The Spectator, each of 
these virtues is other-regarding, and together, they represent the moderate, polite, and social virtue 
Addison believed necessary to the burgeoning commercial society of the eighteenth century. The 
Spectator’s attack on Stoicism as “the pedantry of virtue” continues the Addisonian critique, by 
implying that Stoicism is overly interested in virtue for virtue’s sake or for the individual’s private 
benefit and that it is not adequately concerned with the salutary effects virtue can and should have on 
social and political relations. The Spectator papers themselves, which modeled peaceable social 
interaction by their very form and which sought to encourage a polite, thoughtful, and judicious 
sociability by providing proper topics of conversation as well as subtle guidance to individuals about 
how best to think about these topics, correct the Stoic/Catonic understanding of virtue by promoting 
virtues which render their possessor beneficial to society and pleasing to others. In The Spectator, the 
ornaments of virtue are not Cato’s stern and foreboding countenance, but good nature and 
cheerfulness--certainly not the attributes that spring to mind when one considers the character of Cato. 
Addisonian virtue is amiable, and the awful virtue of a Cato cannot ultimately be endorsed as the 
model upon which social men and women should pattern themselves.43 
In Epistle XI, Seneca exhorts Lucilius to “cherish some man of high character and keep him ever 
before your eyes, living as if he were watching you. ... Choose therefore a Cato!” Addison clearly 
admires Cato and wants the audience to admire certain facets of Cato’s character--his commitment to 
liberty, his antifactional patriotism, his personal integrity, and his steadfast character--but both the 
play itself and The Spectator call into question the notion that the dramatic Cato is a model simply to 
be imitated. Just as Seneca’s epistle softens its endorsement of simply imitating Cato by continuing, 
“or, if Cato seems too severe a model, choose some Laelius, a gentler spirit,” Addison also finds 
Cato’s virtue unsuitable for his audience and seeks--through the play’s romantic subplot and through 
The Spectator--to rework Cato’s qualities into a gentler model, one which gives weight to qualities 
such as friendship, love, and sympathy and which is more appropriate to the peaceable civil and 
commercial society he seeks to promote. 
 
Footnotes 
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